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Abstract—Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are an im-
portant component of intelligent transportation systems, which
are set to become part of global transportation infrastructure
in the near future. In the context of such networks, security
requirements need to rely on a combination of reputation of
communicating agents and trust relations over the messaging
framework. This is crucial in order to maintain dynamic and
safe behaviour under all circumstances. Formal correctness,
resolution of contradictions and proven safety of transitive
operations in the presence of reputation and trust within the
infrastructure remain mostly unexplored issues. This could
lead to potentially disastrous situations, putting lives at risk.
In this paper we provide a proof-theoretic interpretation of a
reputation and trust model for VANET. This allows for formal
verification through translation into the Coq proof assistant,
and can guarantee consistency of messaging protocols and
security of transitive transmissions.
1. Introduction
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) consist of vehi-
cles and roadside unit networks created to enhance trans-
portation systems through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications. VANET
services include: vehicle and road safety services, which
target characteristics like the decrease of traffic accidents
and loss of life to vehicle occupants; traffic efficiency and
management services, which aim to improve traffic flow,
traffic coordination, and to provide local and map infor-
mation; information and entertainment services, to provide
multimedia data transfer and global Internet access, [7].
Due to their distributed and dynamic nature, such net-
works are open to several types of threats, including false
message propagation. Trust and reputation are among the
most used concepts to ensure integrity, reliability and safety
of services. Several methods have been implemented in
VANETs to manage trust, see [14] for a recent overview.
Trust models in VANETs differ in accordance to the main
object of the model: entity-centric [9], [4], data-centric [12],
[8] and combined [16]. The work in [15] offers an analysis
that accounts for reputation as a characteristic of message
forwarding among vehicles, drivers and other agents: reputa-
tion of these agents is based on a descriptive ontology and is
used to provide feedback in the system. An overview of the
issues related to trust in fixed and mobile ad hoc networks
is given in [17], while other approaches for trustworthiness
and reputation in ad hoc mobile networks are presented, for
example, in [3], [2].
In most of these models, the analysis relies on sim-
ulations. However, such simulations cannot guarantee the
absence of unpredictable and unsafe behaviours. Since
VANETs are meant to include safety and emergency mes-
sages, more reliable methods are essential. The only method
to produce exhaustive safety control is through formal ver-
ification, but unfortunately none of the current trust and
reputation models seem to have focused on a formal correct-
ness requirement to ensure that the protocols are verifiable.
Formal approaches to VANET include the work in [6]
for the verification of a congestion control protocol using
the model checker PRISM to investigate its correctness
and effectiveness; verification of privacy and authentication
using the AVISPA tool in [1]; verification of the TESLA
authentication protocol [5] using Petri nets. Such approaches
are few and far apart. Moreover, they do not focus explicitly
on trust or reputation and they are all based on model
checking. Other formal verification techniques like theorem
proving seem to have been ignored so far. Moreover, an
additional problem, i.e., ensuring that safety is preserved
over transitive operations, remains unexplored. In particular,
the problem of a message passing over from vehicle vi to
vj and from vj to vk illustrate the need to guarantee that
for each such transition security and safety properties are
preserved.
The present paper addresses both problems mentioned
above. In Section 2, we formulate a proof-theoretic trans-
lation of the trust and reputation model for VANET given
in [15] with an extension of the natural deduction calculus
(un)SecureND from [10]. The aim is, first of all, to show
that the trust properties instantiated through our calculus
faithfully reflect those in a VANET network; accordingly,
non-trustworthy interactions can be identified through a
proof-checking method. On a higher level, the model of-
fered by (un)SecureND has been proven formally cor-
rect through its translation to a Coq library. As such, the
present translation guarantees a similar property for the
whole VANET model. Thanks to the structural properties
of our calculus, we show how transitive message passing
operations, in the form of instances of a cut rule, are
guaranteed safe via applying a normalisation result. In other
words, we are able to qualify as safe a message passing
operation through any number of vehicles by checking at
each interaction that consistency is preserved. In Section 3,
we illustrate protocols for handshaking, recipient selection
and message passing based on reputation. In Section 4,
we give a reputation model based on an evaluation of
parametrised feedback messages, in view of a temporal
measure and a ranking of the relevant service characteristic
of each message.
2. (un)SecureND
Recall that (un)SecureND is a natural deduction calculus
defining trust, mistrust and distrust protocols introduced
in [11] and extended in [10] with a negation connective.
Here we provide a slightly modified version, adapted for a
VANET network. In particular, in the present version we
introduce: contexts as sets of sets; formulas with multiple
indices to account for service and message numbers; ranking
on service characteristics. We start with introducing the
language of the logic:
Definition 1 (Syntax of (un)SecureND).
A≺ := {V,R}
V := {v1 ≺ · · · ≺ vn}
R := {rsu1 ≺ · · · ≺ rsum}
S := {S1, . . . , Sn}
C := {CS1−→n , . . . , CSn−→n }
φA
C
Si
j
:= aA
C
Si
j
| ¬φAi,j | φAi,j → φAk,l | φAi,j ∧ φAk,l
| φAi,j ∨ φAk,l | ⊥ | Read(φACSij ) |
Write(φA
C
Si
j
) | Trust(φA
C
Si
j
)
ΓA := φAi,j | φAi,j < φAk,l | ΓA;φAi,j
A is the set of agents issuing messages containing
vehicles V and roadside units (RSUs) R. Below we will
focus in particular on V2V communication, without loss of
generality. The order ≺ between agents is a reputation order,
defined below in Section 4. S denotes a set of services. C
denotes a set of service characteristics, with each element
CSi−→n denoting the set of n characteristics of service Si. We
assume, here and throughout, that characteristics CSi−→n of
services for each service Si are associated with an order
≤, so are given as posets, and the ordering ≤ is used to
order messages below in Definition 4. Note that for two
characteristics CSi−→n and C
Sj−→n respectively with i 6= j, there
is no order between them.
Messages are boolean formulae, closed under connec-
tives and including ⊥ to express conflicts. Messages are
signed by agents generating them and by service and char-
acteristic identifiers: φvi
C
Sk
j
expresses a message φ about
characteristic Cj of service Sk generated by vehicle vi. To
simplify, we often abbreviate this notation as φvik,j . When
required, we will refer to a set of messages about service
Sk and characteristic Cj from vehicle vi as MviSk,Cj ; this
notation can be further generalised to a whole set of vehicles
{vi, . . . , vk} ⊆ A. A profile for vehicle vi, denoted as Γvi
is the current list of all messages collected by vi from
available sensors, other agents and networks. For the present
purposes, information from networks will be indexed at
their first receiving vehicle, so as not to add networks as
separate agents. For example, a vehicle profile Γvi receives a
message φj,k about service Sj = weather and characteristic
Ck = temperature stating φ = (temp ≥ 5◦C). We can
now define the notion of judgement in the language:
Definition 2 (Judgements). A judgement Γvl `s φvji,k states
that a message φ about service i and characteristic k signed
from agent vj is validly accessed at step s ≥ 0 under the
profile of agent vl.
Definition 3 (Validity). A judgement `s φvji,k says that a
message φ about service i and characteristic k signed from
vehicle vj holds for any vehicle’s profile at step s.
Messages satisfy a ranking based on characteristics:
Definition 4. We define an order < between messages such
that φvji,k < φ
vj
i,l holds if C
Si
k ≤ CSil for a vehicle vj .
Therefore the order relation ≤ between service char-
acteristics induces validity under profile: if a characteristic
k is essential to another characteristic l with respect to
a service i for a vehicle vj , then vj will be required to
obtain a value for k in order to validly access a value for
l. An example of such order between characteristics could
be as follows: under the service weather, Ck = humidity
and Cl = precipitation− forecast, where the former
characteristic is essential to determine the latter.
A valid vehicle profile meets all the requirements and
conflicts clauses of all service messages that the vehicle
receives. A conflict is generated by two contradictory mes-
sages, and the profile is valid when such conflicts are
avoided; a requirement is the need of a given value for some
service and requirement, and a valid profile contains all such
required values. We use profile as a typing term to denote
a sets of formulas valid for a vehicle. Profile construction
by service messages requirements is defined by rules from
Figure 1. We start by declaring an empty profile to be valid
(base case); by Message Insertion, a valid message can be
inserted in a vehicle profile; by Requirement Insertion, a
profile can be extended by satisfied service requirements; by
Profile Extension, if a message holds in an empty profile,
it can be added to an existing profile. In this syntax, the
construction of two vehicle profiles Γvi ; Γvj : profile will
typically denote the existence of an active communication
channel between vehicles vi, vj .
2.1. Rules for message construction
The operational rules in Figure 2 formulate composi-
tionality of messages. The rule Atom establishes that a
vehicle and a communication channel between vehicles can
qualify a message as valid if all its requirements are satisfied.
Rule ⊥ expresses that contradictory messages imply access
to their negation. Rule ∧-I allows to compose message
originating from different vehicles; by rule ∧-E, decom-
position is valid for the channel obtained by the vehicles
Empty Profile{} : profile
` φvji,k Message Insertion
φ
vj
i,k :profile
Γvj , φ
vj
i,k : profile Γ
vj , φ
vj
i,k `s ψvki,l Requirement Insertion
Γvj , φ
vj
i,k < ψ
vk
i,l :profile
Γvi : profile `s ψvkj,l
Profile Extension
Γvi ;ψvkj,l :profile
Figure 1. The System (un)SecureND: Profile Construction Rules
from which the messages originate. Rule ∨-I says that a
channel of two vehicles profiles can access any message
produced from each of the composing vehicle profiles; by
the elimination rule ∨-E, each message consistently inferred
by each individual vehicle profile can also be executed under
the channel between the profiles of the two vehicles. Rule
→-Introduction expresses inference of a message from a
channel as inference between messages (Deduction Theo-
rem); its elimination through rule →-E allows to recover
such inference as profile extension (Modus Ponens).
2.2. Access Rules
In Figure 3 we present the access rules on messages.
These allow a vehicle to act on messages received from
another vehicle. Rule ¬-distribution expresses profile con-
sistency: if a vehicle profile does not allow inferring a
message φi,j , then it allows inferring any other message
whose requirements do not include φi,j . Rule read says
that from any consistent vehicle profile a message can be
read provided its requirements are satisfied (if any). Rule
trust works as an elimination rule for read: it says that if a
message is received by a vehicle and it preserves its profile
consistency, then it can be trusted. Rule write works as an
elimination rule for trust: it says that a message readable
and trustable by a vehicle can be broadcast. Rule exec says
that every message consistently received by a vehicle is valid
in it. The rule MTrust-I says that currently held message
conflicting with a newly arrived message is mistrusted,
i.e., removed from the current vehicle profile until none of
its consequences are included; the corresponding MTrust-E
elimination allows to trust any message consistent with the
conflict resolution by removal of the mistrusted message in
the vehicle profile, including any required dependency: this
is expressed by the side condition that requires checking
with any other vehicle with higher reputation than the sender
of the original message. The side condition can be modified
at will, e.g., to design a protocol that will restore previous
information if a sufficient number of other vehicles with
higher reputation support it. mistrust is a flag for facilitating
removal of messages present in the vehicle profile conflict-
ing in view of incoming new information.
2.3. Structural Rules
Structural rules hold with restrictions for (un)SecureND,
see Figure 4. As a result, the system qualifies as substruc-
tural, see for instance [13]. Weakening is constrained by an
instance of trust: it says that valid information is preserved
under a vehicle’s profile extension, assuming the latter is
provably consistent. Contraction is constrained by preserva-
tion of ordering: it says that removing identical messages
from a vehicle’s profile is admissible, with the constraint
that the copy from the vehicle with higher reputation is
preserved. Exchange is constrained by dependency: it says
that reorder of messages is admissible if there is no involved
dependency between them. Finally, the Cut rule expresses
validity under a vehicle’s profile extension: if a message φi,j
is valid for vehicle vi and after messaging it to vj the latter
can infer φi,k, then vi can infer φi,k by setting a message
protocol with vj .
Theorem 1 (Normalisation). Any message φi,k valid for a
channel vi, vj and obtained by an occurrence c of the Cut
rule can be validated without c using only trust.
Proof. By induction on the derivation D which is the redex
of the cut-elimination. Assuming c is the only Cut rule and
it is the last inference rule of the redex, the derivation D′
which is the contractum of the cut-elimination contains a
descendent of the cut obtained by an instance of Weakening
under trust. Because the formula obtained by the cut is,
by hypothesis, derivable from the weaker protocol, it will
also be derivable from the weaker and the stronger protocol
together. When c is not the last inference rule of the redex,
then the descendent of the cut will admit all similar Weak-
ening preserving the one occurring in the cut; those imports
by Weakening will occur also in the contractum of the cut
rule and can be traced back up to the one formulation of
the import that occurs in the cut rule.
Normalisation justifies a safety property of our trust
and reputation model over transitive transmissions: for each
vehicle vi, vj , vk, if vk holds information φi,j and this
information is passed to vj , then every valid message de-
rived from φi,j by vk can be inferred by vj assuming the
consistency (by trust) of its profile with that of vk; similarly
now, vj can pass φi,j to vi, and the latter can infer from
there, assuming its profile is consistent with those of vj , vk.
Γvi ; Γvj : profile
Atom, for any φvji,l ∈ Γvj
Γvi ; Γvj `s φvji,l
Γvi `s φvii,j → ⊥ ⊥
Γvi `s+1 ¬φvii,j
Γvi `s φvii,l Γvj `s′ ψvji,m ∧-I
Γvi ; Γvj `max(s,s′)+1 φvii,l ∧ ψvji,m
Γvi ; Γvj `s φvii,l ∧ ψvji,m ∧-E
Γvi ; Γvj `s+1 φ/ψvi/ji,l/m
Γvi ; Γvj `s φvi/ji,l ∨-I
Γvi ; Γvj `s+1 φvi/ji,l ∨ ψ
vi/j
i,m
Γvi ; Γvj `s φvi/ji,l ∨ ψ
vi/j
i,m φ/ψ
vi/j
i,l/m `s′ ξ
vi/j
k,n ∨-E
Γvi ; Γvj `max(s,s′)+1 ξvi/jk,n
Γvi ;φvii,l `s ψvji,m →-I
Γvi `s+1 φvii,l → ψvji,m
Γvi `s φvii,l → ψvji,m Γvi `s′ φvii,l →-E
Γvi ;φvii,l `max(s,s′)+1 ψvji,m
Figure 2. The System (un)SecureND: Operational Rules
Γvi `s ¬O(ψvji,l) O ∈ {Read, Trust,Write},¬-distribution
Γvi `s+1 O(¬ψvji,l)
read
Γvi `s Read(ψvji,l)
Γvi `s Read(ψvji,l) Γvi ;ψvji,l : profile
trust
Γvi `s+1 Trust(ψvji,l)
Γvi `s Read(ψvji,l) Γvi `s′ Trust(ψvji,l)
write
Γvi `s′+1 Write(ψvji,l)
Γvi `s Write(ψvji,l)
exec
Γvi `s+1 ψvji,l
Γvi `s Read(ψvji,l)→ ⊥ Γvi \ {¬ψvii,l} : profile
MTrust-I
Γvi \ {¬ψvii,l} `s+1 ¬Trust(¬ψvii,l)
Γvi \ {¬ψvii,l} `s ¬Trust(¬ψvii,l) Γvk ;ψvji,j : profile MTrust-E, ∀vk ≺ vj
Γvi \ {¬ψvii,l}; Γvk `s+1 Trust(ψvji,l)
Figure 3. The System (un)SecureND: Access Rules
3. Opportunistic Forwarding
In this section we present the algorithm and exemplify
derivations for handshaking and opportunistic message for-
warding protocols. The algorithm consists of two parts: it
first selects a recipient for the communication according to a
reputation model; then it implements message forwarding if
consistency is guaranteed by trust. The pseudo-code of the
full protocol with handshaking and opportunistic forwarding
is formulated in Figure 5. Here we use protocol operations
named after the relevant SecureND rules, as well as symbols
for vehicles, services and characteristics.
In Figure 6 we present the SecureND translation of
the handshaking protocol. Here Service 1 identifies the set
of messages for this protocol. By Hello Message, a user
vi with a well-defined profile with a ‘hello’ message in
its recognition service sends the message to the network;
a user vk reading the message and assuming it preserves
consistency (e.g. there is no instruction in its profile to
ignore messages from vi), accepts it and forwards it further,
including a ‘hello’ back to vi.
In Figure 7, we present an example derivation of the
recipient selection protocol. Here the idea is as follows:
after vi broadcasts a ‘hello’ message, both vk, vj receive
and accept the message; at this stage a recipient is selected
on the basis of the reputation order between vk and vj , so
that a new profile is built out of vi and the higher of the
two recipients, thus modelling a communication channel.
In Figure 8, we present an example derivation modelling
a message passing protocol (without mistrust). Here Service
2 is a service of any kind. By the first premise in MP, the
Handshaking Protocol is guaranteed terminating, including
the Recipient Selection protocol if required; vk then reads a
message issued by vi, checks for validity in its own profile
through an application of trust, and if this check is passed
the message is forwarded.
4. Reputation Model
In this section we illustrate the definition of the order
relation ≺ to formalise the reputation model across vehi-
cles, implementing the system in [15]. The main idea of
Γvi `s φvii,j Γvi `s′ Trust(φvjj,k) Weakening
Γvi ;φ
vj
j,k `max(s,s′+1) φvii,j
Γvi ;φ
vj
j,k;φ
vk
j,k `s ψvii,j vj ≺ vk
Contraction
Γvi ;φ
vj
j,k `s+1 ψvii,j
Γvi ;φvii,j ;φ
vi
i,k `s ψvii,j φvii,j ≮ φvii,k Profile Exchange
Γvi ;φvii,k;φ
vi
i,j `s+1 ψvii,j
Γvi `s φvii,j Γvj , φvii,j `s′ φvji,k
Cut
Γvi ; Γvj `max(s,s′)+1 φvji,k
Figure 4. The System (un)SecureND: Structural Rules
PROCEDURE OpportunisticForwarding(vi, vj)
IF vi Write(HELLO)
THEN forall [vk ∈ A | vk Write(HELLO)],
SELECT min(vk,≺)
DO Handshaking(vi, vk)
ENDIF
IF Handshaking(vi, vk)
THEN vi Write(φi,k) AND vk Read(φi,k)
IF vk Trust(φi,k)
THEN vk Write(φi,k)
ELSE vk ¬Trust(φi,k)
ENDIFELSE
IF forall vi ≺ vk , vi Trust(φi,k)
THEN vk Trust(φi,k)
ELSE vk ¬Trust(φi,k)
ENDIFELSE
ENDIF
ENDPROCEDURE
Figure 5. Algorithm Opportunistic Forwarding
the model is the following. First, for any given message
related to a service and a characteristic received from an-
other agent (either vehicle or RSU), a vehicle will collect
all the formulas that follow from accepting it, assuming
each is consistent with the current profile. This is called
the Feedback Set of an agent with respect to a message.
Given all elements in this Feedback Set, the vehicle assigns
weights to them according to the time they are received, so
that the later the message, the more relevant the reaction
to it. In our system, time is encoded directly by derivation
steps. This is called the Vehicle’s Perception with respect
to a message. Next, this value is generalised to a whole set
of messages concerning a service and a characteristic, by
further assigning weights to each message by the relevance
of the characteristic of interest, so that the higher this value
the least urgent the message. We call this generalised value
the Vehicle’s Perception of a Characteristic Set. Hence, for
each vehicle and service, a vehicle will result having higher
reputation than another (with respect to a set of messages) if
and only if the Perception of a Characteristic Set for that set
of messages of the former is higher than that of the latter.
We proceed now with the formalisation of this model.
To model the set of feedback that a given vehicle pro-
vides with respect to a given message related to a service and
characteristic, we will have to collect all formulas holding
following receiving a message:
Definition 5 (Feedback Set). The feedback set of vehicle vj
for a message φvii,j , for all vj , vi ∈ A is the set of formulas
ψ
vj
i,k such that they agree with φ
vi
i,j for the service identifier
i and are obtained by a derivation construed by a read rule
followed by a → I rule, i.e.
FSvj (φvii,j) = {ψvji,k | Γvj `s Read(φvii,j)→ ψvji,k}
By way of example, consider the simple derivation from
Figure 9, which induces FSvk(mvi,j2,1 ) = {mvk2,2}.
Notice that, by construction, this set includes only feed-
back to received messages that are consistent with the
current user’s profile.
Definition 6 (Vehicle’s Perception). The perception of ve-
hicle vj for a message φvii,j , for all vj , vi ∈ A is the sum of
elements of the feedback set over that formula, weighted by
the step of the derivation at which it is obtained:
AP vj (φvii,j) =
∑
FSvi (φ
vj
i,k)
(s(ψ
vj
i,k ∈ FSvi(φvji,k)))
Intuitively, the value of s at each step of each derivation
leading to each formula in the feedback set of a vehicle to a
given service and characteristic is summed up to provide a
value that increases linearly to reflect a step value for a time
function. The value of AP vj (φvii,j) will reflect the aggrega-
tion of all the feedback provided on each characteristics of
a given service.
We can now generalise to the set of all feedback on a
characteristic for a given service, remembering that these are
given in a preorder so that the position of the characteristic
in that order is mapped into an integer:
Definition 7 (Vehicle’s Perception of Characteristic Set).
The perception of vehicle vj for a set of messages MASi,Ck
from other vehicles about characteristic Ck of service Si is
the sum of elements of the feedback set over the messages
received about that service characteristic, weighted by the
steps of the derivation at which it is obtained and further
by the value r(Ck) of the rank of characteristic k:
AP vj (MASi,Ck) =∑
FSvi (φ
vj
i,k...φ
vn
i,k)
(1− r(Ck)(s(ψvji,k ∈ FSvi(φvji,k . . . φvni,k))))
Using the vehicle’s perception of characteristic set, we
can define the order of reputation with respect to services
Γvi : profile Γvi `1 hellovi1,1 Hello Message
Γvi `2 Write(hellovi1,1)
Γvi `1 Write(hellovi1,1) Γvk `2 Read(hellovi1,1) Γvk ;hellovi1,1 : profile Response Message
Γvk ;hellovi1,1 `3 Write(hellovk1,1)
Figure 6. The Handshaking Protocol
Γvj,...,n ;hellovi1,1 `1 Write(hellovj,...,n1,1 ) vl ∈ min(vi,...,n,≺) Recipient Selection
Γvi ; Γvl : profile
Figure 7. The Handshaking Protocol
Γvi ; Γvk : profile Γvi `1 Write(mvi2,1)
MP
Γvk `2 Read(mvi2,1) Γvk ;mvi2,1 : profile
Γvk `3 Trust(mvi2,1)
Γvk `4 Write(mvi2,1)
Figure 8. The Message Passing Protocol
Γvi ; Γvk : profile Γvj ; Γvk : profile
Γvi ; Γvj ; Γvk : profile Γvk `1 Write(mvi,j2,1 )
Γvk `2 Read(mvi,j2,1 ) Γvk ;m
vi,j
2,1 : profile
Γvk `3 Trust(mvi,j2,1 )
Γvk `4 Write(mvi,j2,1 ) Γvk ;m
vi,j
2,1 `5 mvk2,2
Γvk `6 mvi2,1 → mvk2,2
Figure 9. An Example Feedback Set
and characteristics, which establishes a higher position for
the vehicle whose perception on the characteristics set for
that Service is greater.
Definition 8 (Reputation). ∀vi, vj ∈ V, Si ∈ S, vi ≺ vj ↔
AP vi(MASi,Ck) > AP vj (MASi,Ck).
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have formulated a proof-theory for trust
and reputation in VANETs. Our language is modelled on the
logic (un)SecureND, including an explicit trust function
on formulas to guarantee consistency check at each retrieval
step (after a read function), before forwarding is granted for
a package (by a write function). Forwarding is modelled in
an opportunistic fashion, selecting receivers on the basis of
their reputation ranking. Trust on forwarding also guarantees
correctness on transitive transmissions. Moreover, reputation
is used to implement the resolution protocol for restoring
information after removing previously stored data. Sev-
eral improvements for the algorithm are possible, including
majority selection on opportunistic forwarding (instead of
consensus) and separate ordering for vehicles and RSUs.
Validation of the system is obtained by implementation of
the (un)SecureND calculus as a large inductive type
in the Coq proof assistant. The development is available
at https://github.com/gprimiero/SecureNDC. A characteris-
tic of the logic (un)SecureND is its substructural nature,
which in future work can be exploited to investigate cases of
strengthened and limited resource redundancy for fault tol-
erance and source shuffling for security. Other applications
of negative trust can be investigated to distinguish between
malevolent and simply unsuccessful sources.
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